課程資訊
課程名稱
 柯絲卡與道爾的倫理學論爭
Korsgaard and Darwall on Ethics 
開課學期
 107-2 
授課對象
 文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
 彭文本 
課號
 Phl7556 
課程識別碼
 124 M7850 
班次
  
學分
 3.0 
全/半年
 半年 
必/選修
 選修 
上課時間
 星期二2,3,4(9:10~12:10) 
上課地點
 哲研討室三 
備註
 本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。D領域。
總人數上限：15人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
 http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1072Phl7556_ 
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課程概述

關於第一人稱或是第二人稱觀點的爭論無疑是當代倫理學重要的問題。柯絲卡(Korsgaard)在其《規範性的來源》(The Sources of Normativity 1996a)一書中首先發展她的第一人稱觀點的倫理學。而與柯絲卡相對的，道爾(Darwall)之後出版了他有關第二人稱倫理學的著作《第二人稱觀點，德性，尊敬以及可歸責性》(The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 2006)，並嘗試以不同的角度與柯絲卡進行爭辯。在2007《倫理學》期刊的論文集裡，柯絲卡對於道爾的批評提出反駁，同時道爾也對於這個反駁的評論。爾後雙方各自以自己發展的理論基礎擴大到其他議題的研究。柯絲卡擴大其第一人稱觀點的視野陸續出版的了《行動的構成:關於實踐理性和道德心理學的論文集》( The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. 2008)以及《自我的構成:行動，同一性與整合性》 (Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, 2009)；道爾發展其第二人稱觀點的視野出版了 《道德性、權威以及法律: 第二人稱倫理學I》(Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I, 2013a)和《榮譽、歷史和人際關係: 第二人稱倫理學II》(Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II, 2013b)。
本課程的目標是要檢討這個當代倫理學論爭過程中產生的重要文獻，包括柯絲卡和道爾已出版的論文，並且旁及其他學者所參與的討論論文。 

課程目標
 修課學生有能力掌握當代倫理學最新的研究，並且能夠對這些研究提出自己的看法。 
課程要求
 (1) 修課學生必須在每次上課之前閱讀要討論的指定文獻；
(2)修課學生必須在每次上課參與討論
(3)修課學生必須在學期結束前繳交一篇短篇符合學術形式的期末報告。 
預期每週課後學習時數
  
Office Hours
  
指定閱讀
 Darwall, Stephen 2001: “ Because I want it”. Social Philosophy and Policy 18(2): 129-153
— 2006: The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—2007: “Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson”. Ethics 118, 52–69.
—2009: “Why Kant needs the Second-Person Standpoint”. Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, ed. By Thomas E. Hill, 138-158.
—2010a: “Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 253–264.
—2010b: “Moral Obligation: Form and Substance”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CX, 31–46.
—2011: “Being With”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, 4–24.
—2013a: Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—2013b: Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, David 2006: “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action”. Philosophical Review 115, 169–198.
Fleischacker, Sam 2009: “Review of Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint”. Utilitas 21, 117–123.
Hanisch, Christoph 2013: Why the Law Matters to You. Boston, MA: De Gruyter.
— 2014: “Self-Constitution and Other-Constitution: The Non-Optionality of the Second-Person Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 105-129.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996a: The Sources of Normativity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
—1996b: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—2007: “Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint.” Ethics 118, 8–23.
—2008: The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
—2009: Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
—2011: “Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan”. Metaphilosophy 42, 381–394.
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde 2010: “The Moral Standpoint: First or Second Personal?”. European Journal of Philosophy 18, 296–310.
— 2014a: “Contractualism and The Second-Person Moral Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 149-168.
—2014b: “A Constitutive Account of Group Agency” Erkennen 79, 1623-1639.
Rawls, John 1980: Kantian constructivism in moral theory. The Journal of Philosophy 77, 515-572.
Ridge, Machael 2015: “Naïve Practical Reasoning and the Second-Person Standpoint: Simple Reasons for Simple People?” Value Inquiry 49, 17-30.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998: What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.a
Schapiro, Tamar 2010: “Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 229–236.
Wood, Allen 2008: Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2016: Fichte’s Ethical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
參考書目
 Darwall, Stephen 2001: “ Because I want it”. Social Philosophy and Policy 18(2): 129-153
— 2006: The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—2007: “Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson”. Ethics 118, 52–69.
—2009: “Why Kant needs the Second-Person Standpoint”. Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, ed. By Thomas E. Hill, 138-158.
—2010a: “Reply to Schapiro, Smith/Strabbing, and Yaffe”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 253–264.
—2010b: “Moral Obligation: Form and Substance”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CX, 31–46.
—2011: “Being With”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, 4–24.
—2013a: Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—2013b: Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, David 2006: “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action”. Philosophical Review 115, 169–198.
Fleischacker, Sam 2009: “Review of Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint”. Utilitas 21, 117–123.
Hanisch, Christoph 2013: Why the Law Matters to You. Boston, MA: De Gruyter.
— 2014: “Self-Constitution and Other-Constitution: The Non-Optionality of the Second-Person Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 105-129.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996a: The Sources of Normativity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
—1996b: Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—2007: “Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint.” Ethics 118, 8–23.
—2008: The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
—2009: Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
—2011: “Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan”. Metaphilosophy 42, 381–394.
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde 2010: “The Moral Standpoint: First or Second Personal?”. European Journal of Philosophy 18, 296–310.
— 2014a: “Contractualism and The Second-Person Moral Standpoint” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 149-168.
—2014b: “A Constitutive Account of Group Agency” Erkennen 79, 1623-1639.
Rawls, John 1980: Kantian constructivism in moral theory. The Journal of Philosophy 77, 515-572.
Ridge, Machael 2015: “Naive Practical Reasoning and the Second-Person Standpoint: Simple Reasons for Simple People?” Value Inquiry 49, 17-30.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998: What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.a
Schapiro, Tamar 2010: “Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI, 229–236.
Wood, Allen 2008: Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2016: Fichte’s Ethical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
  
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
 課程參與討論 
30% 
  
2. 
 口頭報告 
30% 
  
3. 
 書面報告 
40% 
  
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
 2/19  Korsgaard 1996a chap.1 
第2週
 2/26  Korsgaard 1996a chap.2 
第3週
 3/05  Korsgaard 1996a chap.2 
第4週
 3/12  Korsgaard 1996a chap.3 
第5週
 3/19  Korsgaard 1996a chap.4 凌振庭 
第6週
 3/26  Darwall 2006 chap.1 &2 
第7週
 4/02  春假 
第8週
 4/09  Darwall 2006 chap.4 蘇雍仁 
第9週
 4/16  Darwall 2006 chap.5  
第10週
 4/23  Darwall 2006 chap.9 
第11週
 4/30  Korsgaard on Darwall 凌振庭 
第12週
 5/07  Korsgaard 2009 chap.3 (form and substance of moral principle) 蘇雍仁 
第13週
 5/14  Darwall 2013a chap. 3(form and substance of moral principle) 
第14週
 5/21  Korsgaard 2008 chap.7 vs. Darwall 2013 chap.8 (acting for reason) 
第15週
 5/28  Korsgaard 2009 chap.5 (autonomy) 
第16週
 6/04  Darwall 2013a chap.7 (autonomy) 
第17週
 6/11  Korsgaard 2008 chap.1 (instrumental reason) 
第18週
 6/18  Darwall 2013a cha.6 instrumental reason